BACKGROUND MATERIALS

WORKSHOP ON COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO TEACHING

Summary. “Strategies for Governing” is a new course, taught for the first time online in July-August 2018, for MPP/MPPA students at UMass Amherst. Nine students enrolled in the course. The course attempts to introduce a “macro-level” approach to the study of administrative systems. A book that describes this approach in more detail, also titled "Strategies for Governing," is under contract with Cornell University Press.

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A short introductory video can be viewed at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cbiA4MEEzvw
The Aims of Public Administration: Reviving the Classical View

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Abstract

The scholarly field of public administration (PA) was launched at a dangerous moment in American and world history. This fact influenced early understandings about the aims of the field. PA was understood to be concerned with big problems of governance relating to the very survival of liberal democratic states. This expansive view of PA no longer prevails, for two reasons. One is the cession of territory once included within the domain of PA to fields such as International Relations, Statebuilding, and American Political Development. Another is the rise of Public Management (PM), a more constricted way of thinking about the territory remaining within the domain of PA. Criticisms recently made against PM suggest that a new approach to PA is needed. This new approach should reclaim abandoned territory and revive understandings about the aims of the field that were prevalent at the time of its founding.

Needed: A Broader View of Public Administration

The purpose of this article is to argue for the recrafting of understandings about the aims of research in the scholarly field of public administration (PA), particularly in the United States. PA scholars ought to raise their sights and acknowledge the state as a basic unit of analysis in the field. They should take a longer and broader view of the forces that guide the evolution of states and seek to understand the processes by which states respond to those forces. They should define their role as one of providing advice on the design, consolidation, management, and adaptation of states so that they are effective in advancing human rights.

This proposed approach is not entirely new to American PA. It revives a way of thinking about the field that was familiar to the scholars who launched it in the 1930s and 1940s. This classical conception of PA went into decline after the early 1950s. Parts of the territory that were examined by classical PA were abandoned and occupied by other scholarly fields. Scholars in International Relations (IR) specialized in the design of institutions that were necessary for diplomacy and war. Scholars in the field of Statebuilding specialized in the design and consolidation of institutions within less developed countries. And scholars in American Political Development (APD) claimed responsibility for studying the historical development of public institutions in the United States.

Within the territory that was left to PA, an approach known as Public Management (PM) became dominant. PM should be regarded as a response to the distinctive problems of the United States and other advanced welfare states in the last decades of the 20th century. However, the limitations of the PM approach have become increasingly obvious. To some critics, the PM approach is pinched and shortsighted. These critics are looking for a more expansive approach to the study of PA. In fact, what they are looking for is an approach that reclaims the territory ceded to other fields over the past decades and reconstructs an understanding about the field of PA that would have been familiar to the scholars who founded it in the middle of the 20th century.
The Classical View of PA

The field of PA emerged in the United States in the late 1910s and was consolidated by the late 1940s (Roberts 1994). This was a time of extraordinary disruption in domestic and world affairs. The American economy suffered a short economic depression in the early 1920s and a much longer one in the 1930s. The American Midwest was devastated by climatic change in the mid-1930s. Millions of people were struck by epidemics of influenza and polio. Millions migrated across the United States—from farms to cities, and from the segregated South to the industrialized North. Social and political affairs were upended by a revolution in transportation and communication technologies. The United States was also drawn into two world wars, and then a cold war with the Soviet Union. It struggled to reconstruct countries that were “wrecked and demoralized” by war, in which the prospects for democratic government were dim (Gallagher 1948, 251). Even in the United States, the survival of democracy was not taken for granted. Many Americans were overwhelmed by the rush of events and wondered dictatorship was necessary for peace and order to be restored (Roberts 2017, chap. 3).

The men and women who launched the new field of PA in these decades were acutely aware that they lived in dangerous times. Their views about the aims and scope of the field were shaped by this awareness. They understood that there were certain basic functions that a state must perform, such as the maintenance of peace and order, protection against external threats, and the promotion of stable economic growth (Merriam 1944, 21 and 22; White 1948, 5). They also understood that the American state was failing to perform these functions; that it was, in Charles Merriam’s words, a “sick state” (Merriam 1945, 32). This sickness arose because the institutions of American government had not been updated to suit modern conditions. As Luther Gulick said, public institutions were “three generations behind our necessities and our social and economic world” (Gulick 1933, 63). Consequently, scholars in the new field examined how those institutions should be renovated so that the health of the state could be restored, in the United States and abroad. “The stakes are beyond price,” Leonard White warned in the 1939 edition of his textbook on PA. If democratic government failed, “an autocratic alternative may await the opportunity to seize power” (White 1939, 34).

The view of PA that was shared by these early scholars had six features:

1. It operated at a high level of analysis. Its view of the field was founded on the concept of the state and a concern for the relationship of the state to broader social and economic conditions (Roberts 2013, 9–21). “The idea of the state,” Woodrow Wilson said in an essay that was widely admired by early PA scholars, “is the conscience of administration” (Wilson 1887, 201).

2. It was concerned with the external as well as domestic affairs. It recognized that the United States and other states confronted similar challenges in building effective institutions, that national security was an essential aspect of governance, and that a well-designed international order was necessary to avoid relapses into “chaos and misery” (Wallace 1943, 3–4; Walter 1945, 183).

3. This conception of public administration was dynamic. The conditions confronting states were understood to be turbulent, requiring the constant renovation of institutions so that they were adapted to “the compulsions of the environment” (Gulick 1948, 1).

4. It was understood that a long-run view of institutional development was necessary. Good scholarship required a “historically conditioned sensitivity” to the relationship between administrative practices and environmental factors (Caldwell 1955, 459–461).

5. Early scholars were realists. They believed, as Alexander Hamilton did, that “the circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite,” and that the durability of public institutions could not be taken for granted (Hamilton, Madison et al. 1888, 136). The “breakdown of government” was a real possibility (Baxter 1938). “[F]ailure to respond to the necessities of change” could lead to the collapse of social order (Merriam 1945, 37).

6. Finally, these scholars had clear normative commitments. They were determined to improve state capacity while also protecting a broad range of individual rights. Indeed, the very aim of statebuilding was to improve “the capacity of peoples for the attainment of the good life” (White 1939, 7; White 1948, 148). It followed from this that the study of public administration had to include the examination of “such matters of justice, liberty, obedience, and the role of the state in human affairs” (White 1948, 10).

We can call this the classical view of PA. It faded away in the 1950s and the 1960s. Today, dominant understandings about the aims and scope of PA are quite different. PA scholars generally do not talk about the state and its relationship to social and economic conditions. Some key state functions, such as defense, diplomacy, and policing, are given little attention in the PA literature. Scholarship in PA is not permeated by a sense of the fragility of state authority. Nor is it affected by historical consciousness. Instead, most research looks at short time frames, and the immediate past.
What explains this change in attitude within the field of public administration? One cause is the fragmentation of the territory once encompassed within the classical approach. For example, a considerable amount of work relating to defense and diplomacy is now done within the field of IR. Similarly, a great deal of research on problems of state fragility is now done within the field known as Statebuilding, while research on the long-run evolution of state capabilities in the United States is undertaken within the field of APD. The surrender of all this territory left the field of PA with a more limited set of problems. This encouraged the emergence of narrower views about the aims and scope of research in the field.

One of these narrower views is known as PM. PM is an approach to the study of governmental action that emerged in the 1970s in the United States and a few other advanced democracies. Today, the “Public Management paradigm” is well established in the United States and western Europe. Indeed, some scholars suggest that it has “effectively supplanted” the domain previously known as PA (Hughes 2003, 45). The PM approach is an understandable response to the difficulties encountered by mature welfare states in the late 20th century. Nevertheless, challenges to the PM approach have intensified in recent years. Critics have lamented its lack of historical consciousness, its inattention to the social and economic forces that shape governments, and its blindness to the distinctive problems of fragile states. In other words, the broad complaint against the PM paradigm is that it lacks many of the features that were typical of the classical approach to PA.

There is a way to respond constructively to these complaints. We should develop a new approach to the domain of PA, which in many ways revives the classical approach to PA. Some features of classical PA are still evident in other domains that have occupied territory once claimed by PA. An useful first step in this project of intellectual recovery is to canvas these four scholarly fields—IR, Statebuilding, APD, and PM—to understand and contrast their approach to the study of governmental action.¹ Then we can outline how the project of intellectual recovery might proceed and anticipate three objections that are likely to be made against this project.

¹ These scholarly enterprises are referred to interchangeably as disciplines, subdisciplines, fields, and subfields. For convenience, I refer to them all as fields.
Strategies for Governing:
An Approach to Public Management Research for West and East

Alasdair Roberts*

Abstract: Research in Public Management (PM) has run into two obstacles. In Western countries, scholars complain that PM research neglects big questions about the overall design of government and its adaptation to new threats. Meanwhile, Asian scholars complain about the Western-centrism of PM research and its failure to account for the distinctive features of governance in their countries. A new approach to PM research will overcome both obstacles. This new approach assumes that leaders of the world’s 195 states face the common challenge of devising a strategy for governing their territory and population that will achieve security, prosperity, and justice. These “strategies for governing” vary between countries and over time, as leaders wrestle with contradictions among goals, uncertainty about tactics, turbulent environmental conditions, and sticky cultural and institutional inheritances. This is a macro approach to PM research that provides a framework for addressing big questions about governance while overcoming the Western-centric bias of current scholarship.

Keywords: governance, strategy, public administration, public management

TWO PROBLEMS, ONE SOLUTION

The scholarly enterprise known as Public Management (PM) has thrived for forty years but now confronts two obstacles to continued progress. One of these obstacles is perceived mainly in the West; the other, mainly in the East. Fortunately, the two obstacles can be overcome in the same way. PM researchers must learn how

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to study the fundamental problems that are faced by leaders of all states, and the diversity of strategies for governing (SFGs) that are crafted by leaders to manage those problems.

For decades, PM research has been dominated by scholars in the United States and a few other Western democracies, and has focused mainly on the improvement of efficiency or performance within public agencies (Hou, Ni et al. 2011, pp. i47-i48; Walker 2011, p. i56; Haque and Turner 2013, p. 244; Juliani and de Oliveira 2016, p. 1036). This research responded to a crisis of legitimacy in advanced democracies in the late twentieth century that was manifested in public demands for spending reductions and tax cuts (Lynn Jr. 2006, p. 104; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011, p. 6). As Owen Hughes has observed, “governments were faced with declining real revenue [and] political demands to maintain services at the same levels. In these circumstances, the only avenue was to improve productivity” (Hughes 2003, p. 51). Policymakers and PM scholars were preoccupied with making public agencies “work better and cost less” (Gore 1993).

Over the last decade, many Western scholars have questioned this focus on agency-level performance. They observe that Western governments are buffeted by powerful forces, such as the resurgence of terrorism and great power tensions, climate change, advances in information technology, mass migration, rising populism, and deepening societal divisions. PM researchers have struggled to make sense of these broad trends and give advice on how they should be dealt with. The decades-long focus on agency-level performance has created a gap in analytic capabilities: research on “big questions” about the overall design of government, and its adaptation to changing conditions, has been discredited for many years, and the theoretical equipment for addressing such questions has been abandoned (Milward, Jensen et al. 2016; Peters and Pierre 2016; Pollitt 2016).

Scholars outside the developed West have different complaints about PM research. Some have charged Western scholars with ethnocentrism and parochialism (Fitzpatrick, Goggin et al. 2011, p. 827; Hou, Ni et al. 2011, p. i46). Many Asian scholars resisted the “global paradigm” for public management that was promoted in the 1990s and early 2000s because it reflected the priorities of Western rather than non-Western states. They observed how Western-style reforms often failed because they were “not compatible with the inherent political, social, and cultural institutions of developing countries” (Ho and Im 2015, p. 276). Asian scholars have called for a true global dialogue in which the distinctive challenges of non-Western countries are acknowledged (Gulrajani and Moloney 2012, p. 85; Haque and Turner 2013).

In sum, PM research has hit two roadblocks, one in the West and one in the East. A new approach to research provides a way around both. It provides scholars with
tools for investigating big questions, as Western critics would like to do. And it makes room for the distinctive circumstances emphasized by Eastern critics. This new approach enables a global dialogue about problems of public administration, while recognizing that the architecture of administration always differs among countries. This approach restores the state as a central concept in the study of public administration. All states have leaders who struggle to invent strategies for governing (SFGs) that will advance goals such as security, prosperity and justice. But national conditions and priorities vary over place and time. Consequently, the content of those strategies — and the architecture of the institutions that give effect to them — also varies between countries, and between generations. An additional aim of PM research should be to understand the processes by which SFGs are formed and to assess their merits.

RECOGNIZING STATES

The SFG approach adds a new level of analysis to PM research. Other disciplines operate at more than one level: there is micro-economics as well as macro-economics, and there are subfields of political science that focus on individuals or communities as well as regimes or countries. But public management has limited its range over the last forty years, focusing mainly on agencies, networks of agencies, or programs within agencies — that is, on the meso-level of government. There is also an initiative to concentrate more narrowly on “the micro-perspective of individual behavior” (Tummers, Olsen et al. 2016, p. 1). There is no counterweight to this emphasis on meso- and micro-levels, no systematic form of macro-research, as there is in other fields. This was not always the case. Until the 1950s, researchers in American public administration routinely operated at a higher level as well, invoking the state as a central concept in their work (Roberts 2018, pp. 2-3). Progress in PM research requires that we revive the state as a core concept.
Grand Strategy Isn’t Grand Enough

The world’s best national security minds know to study every aspect of foreign policy. That’s not enough.

Alasdair Roberts  February 20, 2018, 3:38 PM

Grand strategy is a concept familiar to experts on foreign policy and national security. Its meaning has inflated over the years. Some critics think that it has
bloated so much that it is no longer useful — but they are wrong. The real problem with grand strategy is that it is not grand enough.

In the 19th century, grand strategy was about the actual fighting of wars. A commander in a single theater of operation had a strategy for defeating the enemy, and top-level commanders had a larger plan for deploying forces across many theaters. Grand strategy, one writer explained in 1904, reckoned with “the whole armed force of the nation, ashore and afloat.”

With the advent of total war, the concept expanded. If victory in war depended on mobilization of the entire physical and moral forces of the nation, as Gen. Erich Ludendorff argued, it followed that wartime planning should have similar scope. B.H. Liddell Hart defined grand strategy as a national policy guiding all aspects of social and economic activity toward the achievement of war aims. “The basis of grand strategy,” other experts agreed in 1942, “is the reciprocal relationship between war and the society in which war occurs.”

With the onset of the Cold War, the concept expanded again. Grand strategy was still concerned with mobilizing the full spectrum of societal resources. But the objectives became fuzzier. During the world wars, national leaders were concerned with actual war-fighting. After World War II, by contrast, the great powers were caught in a decades-long tussle for positional advantage.
Thus the big view of grand strategy that we have today: as Thomas Christensen has defined it, “the full package of domestic and international policies designed to increase power and national security” in peacetime as well as wartime.

Some critics say that theorizing about grand strategy bears little relationship to the way that decisions actually get made. In the real world, they argue, proper coordination of domestic and international policies is all but impossible. Leaders are not visionaries, and they never maintain a steady course toward crisply defined goals. More often, leaders tinker with the status quo, experiment, and lurch from crisis to crisis.

These criticisms are largely misguided. Incrementalism and experimentalism are often a reasonable response to conditions of uncertainty and political polarization. More importantly, the fact that the actual course of policy is erratic or ineffectual does not imply that leaders are neglecting strategy. Some leaders try to behave strategically but are not very good at it. But an inept strategist is still a strategist, just as a bad writer is still a writer. And even the best-laid plans can be thrown into confusion by events.

Leaders are driven to strategy by force of circumstance. The world is a turbulent and dangerous place, and leaders cannot ignore the sphere of foreign affairs without jeopardizing vital interests. They must engage. Each decision must be driven by some calculation about ends and means, and about the implications for other decisions. These are the rudiments of grand strategy. Experts try to improve the quality of strategy, but the impulse for leaders to behave strategically is already there.

But here is the difficulty. The world of domestic affairs is equally treacherous. Machiavelli, the grand old man of realism, warned that a prince must have two fears — “one internal, based on his subjects, the other external, based on
foreign powers.” In democracies, leaders who bungle internal affairs are tossed out in the next election. In autocracies, they are overthrown in coups. And sometimes, clumsy leaders suddenly discover their states collapsing beneath them. If danger in the sphere of foreign affairs impels leaders toward strategy, the same is also true in the sphere of domestic affairs.

It is easy to see that this is the case. Leaders are constantly refining political programs that are designed to manage threats to vital domestic interests, such as order, prosperity, justice, and their own survival in office. They try to mobilize societal resources and coordinate policy tools to secure these interests. In other words, they formulate a domestic grand strategy. Some leaders do this better than others, but all are driven to do it.

These two grand strategies, foreign and domestic, are intimately connected with each another.

*These two grand strategies, foreign and domestic, are intimately connected with each another.*

Because tranquility at home depends on economic growth, leaders search overseas for resources and markets. Foreign wars are launched or halted as domestic opinion sways back and forth. Leaders make concessions at home — extending the vote, building the welfare state, protecting civil rights — to bolster support for their overseas campaigns. Domestic regulatory powers are trimmed to cement trade agreements with key allies. And so on. The ways in which the two grand strategies may be entangled is endless.

However, we confront a conceptual problem. If there are two grand strategies — one foreign, one domestic — is either one of them really grand? Moreover,
do leaders really think this way? We know the answer to these questions. Leaders do not keep Machiavelli’s two fears in separate boxes. They manage both at the same time and search for a coherent approach — a single strategy for governing — that reconciles domestic and foreign pressures at the same time.

Reaganism was a single doctrine whose domestic and foreign components could not be disentangled. So was Clintonism. The same is true today of Trumpism, Putinism, and “Xi Jinping thought.”

Grand strategy, in its conventional formulation, is not grand at all. It is one facet of something larger, an overall strategy for governing. There are some experts who recognize this and seem to stretch the concept of grand strategy accordingly. Peter Trubowitz has defined grand strategy as “a means by which national leaders strive to maintain or strengthen their hold on executive power,” and not just as a way of pursuing foreign-policy objectives. And in a recent book, Andrew Monaghan defines grand strategy as the art of “using all of the nation’s resources to promote the interests of the state, including securing it against enemies perceived and real.” These definitions indicate a desire to move the analysis one level up, for a broader and more integrated view of statecraft. At the end of the day, though, the study of grand strategy usually remains fixed on matters of national security and foreign policy.

To some degree, this is a matter of scholarly convenience. The academic community has a long tradition of bifurcating domestic and foreign policy. But this conceptual division bears no relation to the way that leaders actually think. Realism demands a broader view of strategies for governing.

A more expansive view offers three benefits. The global convergence on market democracy that was predicted in the 1990s has not been realized. We are entering an era in which the governance strategies of great powers are
diverging sharply once again. The debate in coming decades will be over the merits of competing national strategies. We have been here before — at the dawn of the 20th century, in the 1930s, and again during the Cold War. Reformers in every country will be influenced by their judgments about the performance of rival states. As they make these judgments, reformers will not separate questions of domestic and foreign policy. They will look at the track record of other states as a whole. The role of scholars is to help structure this global debate. We can do this more effectively if our theoretical toolkit reflects the realities of the conversation.

A bigger view of strategy is also useful in moments when the conventional wisdom about national policy has broken down.

A bigger view of strategy is also useful in moments when the conventional wisdom about national policy has broken down.

The United States is suffering through one of these moments right now. The old consensus about domestic and foreign policy has shattered, and we are struggling to reassemble the pieces in a new configuration. We need a conversation about the overall design of national policy — and not just about the domestic or foreign components in isolation. Some vessel larger than grand strategy is needed to carry this conversation.

And the third benefit of a broader view? Verisimilitude. Machiavelli, so often named as one of the fathers of modern grand strategy, did not write *The Prince* as a guide to foreign policy, nor as a guide to domestic policy. It was a guide to statecraft in toto. Adopting a similar viewpoint today may seem daunting, but for realists there can no escape from the task. Leaders are not allowed to compartmentalize, and scholars should not either.
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Today, about fifty thousand people are enrolled in graduate programs in public administration in the United States. The broad aim of these programs is declared to be educating leaders for public service. If we are considering a new approach toward the study of public administration, it is reasonable to ask whether our views about the teaching of public administration should change as well. Would a curriculum in public administration look different than it does today?

Yes, although the required adjustment is not radical. A graduate program that prepares leaders ought to have some component that shows how to think broadly about the overall aims of government, the environmental factors that shape judgments about priorities, the methods that have been used in the past to advance those priorities, and the ways in which priorities and methods have been adapted in response to changing conditions. In other words, there ought to be some element of the curriculum that shows students how to think systematically about the challenges of crafting, executing, and adapting strategies for governing. This sort of education would encourage students to take a long view. They would look decades back to see how strategies have evolved, and decades ahead to anticipate new challenges. And there would be a comparative aspect as well. Students would learn how the leaders of other countries wrestle with comparable challenges.

Broadly speaking, graduate programs in public administration in the United States do not train students to think systematically about the big picture. If we look at the curricula of well-regarded graduate programs, we see that they focus on the middle level
of public service: on problems of policy design, management within public organizations, and the implementation and evaluation of programs.\textsuperscript{391} When prospective managers and analysts are encouraged to take a wider view, to look upward and outward, it is often with the purpose of understanding their “authorizing environment”; that is, the constellation of actors in the immediate neighborhood of the agency or program have a direct influence on its behavior.\textsuperscript{392} This is quite different from a broad and long view of the processes by which government as a whole evolves. For example, it is the difference between understanding the prerequisites for success for an agency embedded within the welfare state and understanding the welfare state itself—the reasons for its existence, and its path of development. Some readers might be tempted to say that questions about the purpose and design of the welfare state are better left to political scientists. But the blueprints for the welfare state were drawn deliberately by practitioners and scholars in public administration, and it is a little strange to say that their successors should not revisit them.\textsuperscript{393} The same could be said about the blueprints for the modern regulatory state or the national security state, which were also drafted by scholars in public administration.

A few graduate programs in public administration encourage a broader view by requiring students to complete an overview course on “public administration and democracy” or “public administration and society.”\textsuperscript{394} These courses have limitations. Sometimes they simply push the “authorizing environment” perspective a little further, so that students can see how agency operations are affected by overall institutional and social context. Sometimes these courses refer to recent trends such as globalization and technological change, but there is no systematic survey of all factors that shape strategies for governing. And the focus is exclusively on the United States.\textsuperscript{395} The possibility that
leaders of other countries wrestle with comparable problems, and that they might have
discovered alternative strategies for governing, is not recognized.

How else could a curriculum in public administration be organized? For an
alternative approach, we can look to leading graduate programs in international
relations—many of which also claim to prepare leaders for public service. At the
School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, students must
complete a course called Theories of International Relations, which

[s]urveys a variety of broad theoretical approaches to analyzing the
international political and economic situation. Examines approaches to the
study of power, ideology, state interests, peace and war, international law,
and equilibrium; presents a critique of liberal, conservative and Marxist
conceptions of international politics; and introduces grand theory, political
and economic interpretations of systems structure and the values that
shape perspectives in international politics.

At the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, meanwhile, students
complete a course in the theory and practice of international relations, through which
they:

(a) gain deep knowledge of the dominant theories of international
relations; (b) [learn how] to confidently assess the explanatory power of
these theories in the study and practice of international politics; (c) engage
in a sophisticated and effective way with the most pressing contemporary
policy debates in international politics.
And at Columbia University, graduate students in international relations complete a course called Conceptual Foundations of International Politics, which is designed to help students think theoretically and analytically about leading issues in international affairs by introducing them to social science methods and scholarship and by exposing them to the uses of such concepts in practice, through examination of contemporary problems and challenges in international affairs.399

The administrators of graduate programs in international relations, like their peers in public administration, wrestle with the problem of rationing time in a short professional degree. Still, space is found in the international relations curriculum for courses that take a broad and systematic view of the conditions confronting leaders. The curriculum recognizes that students must “recognize the underlying forces at work in the world . . . [and learn how] to navigate a changing landscape.”400 It is taken for granted that courses such as these are essential for professional success.401 Furthermore, the approach within international relations programs is cosmopolitan. The United States is treated as one state among many: *primus inter pares*, perhaps, but still wrestling with problems that are shared with other states.

Many people agree that globalization has blurred the line between domestic and foreign affairs. However, there is still a peculiar difference in professional training for public service in the realms of domestic and foreign policy. The better approach is one taken by graduate programs in international relations: conscious of the big picture, inclined toward the long view, and attentive to challenges of statecraft. The same sensibility ought to be cultivated within graduate programs of public administration.
There, too, students should know how to recognize and navigate a changing landscape—that is, how to craft, implement, and adapt a strategy for governing.
COURSE DESCRIPTION

This online course provides a broad view of the challenges that confront leaders as they attempt to govern their countries. Specifically, it examines the strategies that are invented by leaders to achieve critical objectives such as national security, internal order, prosperity and justice. We consider why strategy-making is difficult and examine the processes by which leaders design, implement and revise their strategies for governing. We begin with a comparative view of the subject, and end with a focus on challenges in modern-day American governance.

EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES

This course contributes to the following NASPAA-recommended competencies:

- *Lead and manage in public governance*
  
  - Students will learn about the factors and forces that shape strategies for governing, and the challenges that confront leaders as they design strategies that are robust, effective and normatively defensible.
• **Participate in and contribute to the public policy process**
  
  o Students will improve their ability to explain why strategies emerge, assess whether existing strategies are appropriate, and recommend improvements to existing strategies.

• **Analyze, synthesize, think critically, solve problems and make decisions**
  
  o In short exercises, students will describe and assess the strategies currently used by national leaders in the US and abroad.

• **Articulate and apply a public service perspective**
  
  o Students will examine the tradeoffs that arise in strategy-making, and judge whether strategies are achieving critical public objectives, such as the advancement of human rights.

• **Communicate and interact productively with a diverse and changing workforce and citizenry**
  
  o Students will contribute constructively to discussion boards and videoconferences and produce concise and clear written analyses.

**HOW THE COURSE IS STRUCTURED**

The course is six weeks long. Each week will have its own theme:

• Week 1 (July 9-14): Introduction to concepts
• Week 2 (July 15-21): Governing fragile states
• Week 3 (July 22-28): Russia and Putinism
• Week 4 (July 29-August 4): China and 'Xi Jinping Thought'
• Week 5 (August 5-11): India and Modi-ism
• Week 6 (August 12-17): The US and Trumpism

Each week will have a similar structure:

• Sunday-Monday: Background reading and videos.
• Tuesday-Wednesday: Contribute to Blackboard discussion board.
• Wednesday or Thursday: Participate in one-hour videoconference.
• Friday-Saturday: Write a memorandum.

Details about readings, videos, questions for discussion, and memo requirements are available on the Blackboard site.

BASIS OF EVALUATION

The final grade will be determined in the following way:

• Contributions to discussion boards and videoconferences: 30%
• Six memoranda: 70%

REQUIRED TEXTS

Students should purchase the following books. Additional reading and videos will be provided on the Blackboard site.


PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS

Students should follow these professional standards. Non-compliance may result in a failing grade for the course.

• Participation. We should participate actively in discussions.
• *Civility in discourse.* Colleagues should be allowed to express their opinions. Disagreements should be articulated but conveyed with respect. Sometimes we should take time to reflect before we respond. Ad hominem arguments should be avoided.

• *Open-mindedness.* We should be open to the likelihood that we are wrong about facts and the proper interpretation of facts.

• *Academic integrity.* Our work must be the result of our own intellectual effort. We should not use the words or ideas of other people without acknowledgement. For further information about the university’s academic honesty policies and procedures, see https://www.umass.edu/honesty/.

ADVICE ON WRITING

While writing your weekly memos, follow these guidelines:

• *Formatting (5 points)*
  
  o Your paper should be double-spaced. Provide page numbers at the bottom center of each page. Put your name and student number at the top left corner of the first page.

  o Full academic citation is not necessary if you are referring to assigned readings. A brief reference to the author and page number (Roberts, p. 33) will do.

• *Writing Quality (15 points)*

  o Avoid run-on paragraphs. If your paragraph is more than five or six lines long, you probably have more than one idea contained within it. Break that paragraph up.

  o Avoid run-on sentences. If your sentence is more than 15 words long, you should probably break it up.

  o In general, cut all adjectives and adverbs.

  o Proof-read for spelling, grammatical and typographical errors.
• **Summary (15 points)**
  
  o Provide a summary at the start of your memo. This should be one paragraph long. Put the header SUMMARY in front of it. The summary should explain what question you are considering, and briefly summarize the key parts of your answer. This paragraph should be direct and concise -- not more than five lines long.

• **Argument (65 points)**
  
  o The body of your argument should describe and justify your response to the question.

  o The argument should be the product of extensive reflection, demonstrate familiarity with the assigned materials, and acknowledge alternative points of view where appropriate.

  o The argument should be well organized. The flow of ideas from one paragraph to the next should be clear. The main idea of each paragraph should be conveyed in the topic sentence of that paragraph. Headers may be used sparingly to organize the argument, but they are not necessary. Sub-headers should be avoided.

A good (and short) writing guide is The Writer's Diet by Helen Sword. See also her website.

**STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES**

The University of Massachusetts Amherst is committed to providing an equal educational opportunity for all students. If you have a documented physical, psychological, or learning disability on file with Disability Services (DS), Learning Disabilities Support Services (LDSS), or Psychological Disabilities Services (PDS), you may be eligible for reasonable academic accommodations to help you succeed in this course. If you have a documented disability that requires an accommodation, please notify me within the first two weeks of the semester so that we may make appropriate arrangements.
Welcome and syllabus

Introduction to PUBP&ADM 597G, Strategies for Governing

Syllabus

Contact the instructor

Please contact me if you have any questions about the course. I would be glad to talk by phone - and if you are in Amherst, I would also be glad to meet with you in person to talk about the aims of the course!

Alasdair Roberts  
School of Public Policy  
Thompson Hall Room 226  
Email asroberts@umass.edu  
Phone 617-599-9029  
Skype alasdair.roberts  
Website www.aroberts.us

Note on videoconferences

Thanks for your responses to the Doodle Poll. We will have two videoconferences every week:

Thursday 2pm to 3pm
Thursday 6pm to 7pm

You might participate in one of these two videoconferences each week.

Introductions!

We will all enjoy this class more if we get to know each other better. I have a few questions for you:

- Which degree program are you enrolled in?
- Where are you taking this course? You don't need to provide your address, just if you are local to Amherst, MA? in the US? abroad?
- What is one thing you are excited about taking this course? What is one worry?

Ask questions about the course

This discussion forum is for problems and solutions related to this course, including technical glitches, questions about course material, and more. If you have a question or issue, post it here. If you can offer an answer or solution, please do so.
Plan for Week 1

1. Read:
   - Other articles in resources folder.

2. Post a question on the discussion board by 12pm on Wednesday, July 11.

3. Participate in Zoom videoconference on Thursday, July 12.

4. Complete the memo that is due on Saturday, July 14 (6pm deadline).

Resources

Week 1 Discussion Board

Post a question or comment about the assigned reading for this week. Be frank if you disagree with anything you read, or if it isn't clear! As you can see, this is work in progress. So it is entirely possible that I have my facts wrong, that my interpretations or misguided, or my writing is unclear.

Week 1 Videoconference

Enabled: Statistics Tracking
We'll have an online conversation on Wednesday or Thursday (Exact day and time to be determined). Before we have that conversation, post a question or comment about the assigned reading for this week (See above). Be frank if you disagree with anything you read, or if it isn’t clear.

Get technical assistance with Collaborate here

Week 1 Memo

View Assignment
Week 2 (July 15-21): Fragile states

Plan for Week 2

Enabled: Statistics Tracking

READ (IN RESOURCES):


WATCH/LISTEN (IN RESOURCES):

- TED Talk: Paul Collier’s new rules for rebuilding a broken nation (2009)
- TED Talk: Ashraf Ghani on Rebuilding Broken States (2013)

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER:

- The OECD and FFP documents make a distinction between states that are "fragile" and those that are "stable" or "resilient" (in the OECD report) or "stable" or "sustainable" (in the FFP report). But what are the characteristics of a fragile state -- that is, how would you know one when you see one? Conversely, what does a stable state look like? And are stability and resilience the same thing?
- These documents and presenters make claims or assumptions about functions that states ought to perform. What are these core functions?
- Both documents talk about "pressures" or "shocks" that tend to aggravate fragility. What are some of these pressures or shocks?
- The OECD document seems to place a lot of emphasis on democratic institutions, rule of law, and human rights. Why is it doing is -- is it because these features actually promote stability, or because they are important in their own right, regardless of their effect on stability? To put it another way, is it possible to achieve stability or resilience without having these features? (See Paul Collier's presentation.) To push the point further, might it be easier to achieve stability without these features?
- In the OECD report, who exactly is doing the statebuilding? What problems arise when international organizations and other states are actively involved in...
statebuilding efforts? Why does Ashraf Ghani say that "the aid system is broken" and "technical assistance is the ugly face of the developed world"?

- Fixing a fragile state is not easy, and not everything can be done at once. What problems ought to be addressed first, according to these documents? Do you agree?
- Is statebuilding harder or easier than it used to be?

DISCUSSION BOARD

Before noon on Thursday:
- Post an original comment on the discussion board.
- Respond to at least two comments by other participants.

VIDEOCONFERENCE

- Participate in the scheduled videoconference.

MEMO

- Submit memo by Saturday midnight. 750 words maximum. See the syllabus for advice on writing memos.
- SUBJECT: Statebuilding is a subject that garnered a significant amount of attention after the 1990s. It assumes that significant progress in statebuilding is possible within the span of a few years. Some have challenged this notion, asserting that "nation-building occurs in decades, not years." (Ashraf Ghani and Paul Collier both criticize Western assumptions about timeframes in their presentations.) In your view, what can be accomplished in fragile states within the span of a few years, and what is the best strategy for achieving those goals?
Week 2 Memo

View Assignment
Plan for Week 3: Russia

Enabled: Statistics Tracking

READ:


Gorbachev, Mikhail (2016). *My Hopes for Russia*. Prospect (June): 32-34.

WATCH/LISTEN (IN RESOURCES):

Khodorkovsky lecture, February 2015
CEIP Podcast, "Putin 4.0", February 2018

DISCUSSION BOARD

*Before noon on Thursday:*

Post an original comment on the discussion board.
Respond to at least two comments by other participants.

VIDEOCONFERENCE

Participate in the scheduled videoconference.

MEMO

Submit memo by Saturday midnight.

Provide your assessment of the strategy for governing that we will call Putinism. You might want to consider three questions. Is it effective on its own terms -- that is, does it do what Russian leaders would like it to do? Is it sustainable over the long run? And is it normatively defensible -- that is, does it conform to your notions of good governance? These questions are intended as food for thought. You are not required to address all of them.
Week 3 Discussion Board

Russian leaders are pursuing a strategy for governing -- sometimes called Putinism -- that:

- is based on their perception of major threats;
- gives priority to certain goals, based on perceived threats;
- emphasizes certain policies or institutional reforms that seem necessary to pursue those priorities.

What do you think are the most interesting features of current Russian strategy?
Plan for Week 4: China and "Xi Jinping Thought"

Enabled: Statistics Tracking

READ:


WATCH/LISTEN (IN RESOURCES):

TED Talk, Eric X. Li, "A Tale of Two Political Systems," June 2013  
BBC Radio 4, "President Xi and the Chinese Dream," October 19, 2017

DISCUSSION BOARD

Before noon on Thursday:  
Post an original comment on the discussion board.  
Respond to at least two comments by other participants.

VIDEOCONFERENCE

Participate in the scheduled videoconference.

MEMO

Submit memo by Saturday midnight.

Provide your assessment of the strategy for governing currently being pursued by China's leaders. You might want to consider three questions. Is it effective on its own terms -- that is, does it do what China's leaders would like it to do? Is it sustainable over the long run? And is it normatively defensible -- that is, does it conform to your notions of good governance? These questions are intended as food for thought. You are not required to address all of them.

750 words maximum.
Resources
Enabled: Statistics Tracking

Week 4 Discussion Board
Enabled: Statistics Tracking
Chinese leaders are pursuing a strategy for governing -- whose key features are sometimes described as Xi Jinping Thought -- that:

- is based on their perception of major threats;
- gives priority to certain goals, based on perceived threats;
- emphasizes certain policies or institutional reforms that seem necessary to pursue those priorities.

What do you think are the most important features of current Chinese strategy?

Week 4 Videoconference

Get technical assistance with Collaborate here

Week 4 Memo
View Assignment
Plan for Week 5: India and Modi-ism

Enabled: Statistics Tracking

READ:


WATCH/LISTEN (IN RESOURCES):


DISCUSSION BOARD

Before noon on Thursday:

Post an original comment on the discussion board.

Respond to at least two comments by other participants.

VIDEOCONFERENCE

Participate in the scheduled videoconference.

MEMO

Submit memo by Saturday midnight.

Identify the main challenges of governance in India. What is your assessment of the overall strategy -- sometimes known as Modi-ism -- that the current government is using to address these challenges?

750 words maximum.
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| **Get technical assistance with Collaborate here** |

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Plan for Week 6

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READ:


DISCUSSION BOARD

Post an original comment on the discussion board. You may wish to address the memo question, below. But you are welcome to comment on Trumpism more generally if you prefer.

Respond to at least two comments by other participants.

VIDEOCONFERENCE

Participate in the scheduled videoconference.

MEMO

Submit memo by FRIDAY midnight.

We have examined the governing strategies of leaders in four countries (Russia, India, China, the United States). What do you think is the most difficult problem faced by all of these leaders, and what is your assessment of the ways in which different leaders have addressed this problem?

750 words maximum.

Resources

Enabled: Statistics Tracking
Strategies for Governance
7/28/18

**Summary**: Russia is pursuing a strategy of increased militarization, an isolating foreign policy, weakening democratic institutions, and lack of respect for human rights. President Vladimir Putin, who has been a leader in Russia for over 15 years, is at the center of the power structure, and at times is knee deep in implementing the strategy he has pursued for the country. This memo will argue that the strategy we call Putinism is only partially succeeding, but is not sustainable or acceptable from a human rights perspective.

The substance of Putinism revolves around modernizing and professionalizing Russia’s military and accustoming citizens of Russia to the possibility or inevitability of war. The world view that Putinism subscribes to is unique, and it affects both the style of leadership and the substance of policies pursued by Russian leadership. As Monaghan describes it, Putin expects the next decades to bring conflicts over finite resources (27) and internal threats such as color revolutions, and terrorism (86). The assumption that there may be a major war, and that at least smaller-scale conflicts are inevitable, causes Russia to focus on its military goals before its other goals.

Russia’s strategy for governance involves an elite committee, the Security Council, setting strategy and medium to long-term goals for the country, which is then implemented by ministries and departments in the central government. Top-level political leaders manage the implementation of the goals, which affect the economy, infrastructure, transportation, housing, and more (Monaghan, 23). Despite this, only some goals are being met, such as modernizing the military, and often the goals’ implementation must be micromanaged (Monaghan, 46). The president is a hugely important figure in Putinism, in contrast with regional leaders and
technocrats who must follow orders from above. Although Russia has a parliament, its role is not strong enough to act as a check on the executive’s power (Gorbachev, 33).

Looking at Russia and its strategic goals, I see a crisis of leadership and governance. Those tasked with implementing strategies are unwilling or incapable of doing so. The country is stagnating economically and is not succeeding on the world stage. On its own terms, the strategy for governance is only sometimes working. But the same could be said for many forms of government, including our own in the United States. The people in Russia seem to accept the direction of the country. According to a Carnegie Center poll discussed on the DiploPod podcast, Russians now see their country as a world power again. I see that as a success of the messaging that is part of Putinism – that Russia must be united against forces that threaten it.

Putinism is not sustainable because “manual control,” or micromanagement of projects, is intolerable in the long-term, and the need for it signals that the leadership has failed to secure buy-in from those who should be equipped to work independently. The more sustainable alternative would be to invest in the basics – a robust civil service sector, professional development, education, and basic infrastructure that would benefit the economy.

Russia’s militaristic worldview also impacts its standing on the international stage, and is not sustainable economically. Russia’s aggression has gained it critics from both inside and outside. In this week’s reading, the former leader of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, argued that Russia needs more democratic institutions such as a strong parliament and independent judiciary to thrive in the future. As a political exile and someone Putin perceives as a threat, Khodorkovsky criticized the Russian people as “giving up political freedoms in exchange for the good life,” and warned that Putinism will lead to persecutions and xenophobia. Western European and North American countries have also criticized Russia’s aggression, and
imposed sanctions that have had a large impact on the Russian economy after its annexation of Crimea (Monaghan, 36).

Although I think governments have a role in preventing revolution for the purpose of having a stable society, I do not think that Putinism’s war mentality is normatively defensible. For example, the role of the recently created National Guard is to prevent revolutions and “arrest inciters” (Monaghan, 73). Such use of government power and disregard for human rights is unacceptable. I believe that governments have a responsibility to respect human rights. Although no government meets this goal, those that try do a better job.
SUMMARY

The current Chinese leadership has centralized authoritarian control while delivering unprecedented economic gains to Chinese citizens. Xi Jinping’s approach to governing justifies the CCP’s control with strong bureaucratic performance and a theoretical basis founded in traditional Chinese governance. While Westerners are dubious and point out political weaknesses, Chinese cultural differences may enable them to achieve the Chinese Dream.

China’s leadership under President Xi Jinping has turned back into a period of hard authoritarianism, reversing some prior reforms toward openness, and increasing political repression of the Chinese people (Shambaugh, 117). Xi Jinping Thought asserts that the CCP must remain in authoritarian control in order for the nation to achieve the Chinese Dream of becoming a prosperous nation and respected world power (Shambaugh; Buckley, NY Times; BBC). China has made unprecedented progress in comparison to other communist states, particularly in terms of economic growth, but it remains to be seen how well the CCP will adapt to the next challenges in China’s development (Shambaugh).

Xi has reaffirmed the Party’s control over the activities of individuals and institutions in essentially every aspect of civic life (Shambaugh, 119). The Party maintains public support in part by depicting Xi as a Confucian father for the Chinese people and the decisive leader that is needed to direct the nation (Buckley). While Westerners may merely see this as propaganda
alongside China’s pervasive censorship, perhaps this messaging is persuasive because it fits Chinese cultural models which are collectivist and rely on patriarchal leadership.

Xi is a strong statesman leading a meritocratic bureaucracy by incentivizing technocrats to perform effectively, particularly in economic development, at all levels from entrepreneurial state-owned enterprises to the nation’s largest financial institutions (Li TED Talk; Ang BBC). He heads a vertical of power with 15 million CCP employees all following his centralized direction, while also being held accountable for their own performance – similar to Western corporate business structure (Ang). This modernized version of Chinese traditional government has been able to foster massive economic growth, bringing more than 200 million people out of poverty and creating a new middle class (Shambaugh, 58). This is a powerful example of how “socialism with Chinese characteristics” has been effective (BBC).

The question remains whether the CCP can maintain its current level of control or if dissent will rise to demand increased freedom. Xi tells the Chinese people that without the CCP’s firm leadership, chaos and corruption will ensue, and this seems to ring true within Chinese culture (Buckley). In addition, although the West abhors China’s record of human rights abuses, many Chinese citizens are willing to accept the authoritarian regime in exchange for the rights of economic opportunity, universal healthcare, and public education. (Class 8/2/18). However, there are significant pockets of dissatisfaction with the CCP among the college-educated and wealthy elites, as well as in the border lands of Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Those groups could push for revolution. If the CCP is not willing to give them increased autonomy and instead cracks down with coercion or martial rule, confrontation may end up threatening the CCP’s political power (Shambaugh, 95, 129).
Some Western observers such as Shambaugh insist that China’s economic development will stagnate and the CCP will struggle to maintain power unless it adopts political reforms toward partial democracy. In contrast, proponents of the “China Model” believe that other nations may also find economic success by following China’s “scientific” method of governing rather than Western-style democracy (NewsChina). As Li pointed out, electoral democracy does not guarantee effective government, contrary to Western assumptions.

I posit that the CCP may continue to succeed with a pivot to soft authoritarianism instead of full liberalization. China could liberalize their economic policies, facilitating enough economic autonomy to spur innovation, while continuing to maintain strict social control. This should move their economy up the value chain, escaping the middle income trap and facilitating the continued growth that the Party needs to maintain public support. The J-Curve model might not accurately represent Chinese society, in that a little liberalization might not lead to the immediate decrease in stability that is expected in Western cultures (Shambaugh, 11).

Although Westerners are skeptical, Chinese culture and tradition may enable the unprecedented development of a communist state into an advanced economy. While the Chinese method of governing may not be normatively defensible for many other cultures, the CCP’s professionalized bureaucracy under authoritarian control may continue to set global precedents as it navigates upcoming political and economic challenges.
The governing strategy pursued by the government of India, whether under the leadership of the Congress Party or of the Bharatiya Janata Party, is a strategy that is sustainable in the long term. India’s strategy, which it has pursued for seven decades after achieving independence, has set it on a path toward one of the brightest futures in the non-western world. Countries such as Russia and China that are superficially more powerful or prosperous than India have been worse-served by their strategies for governing, and will be surpassed by India in the long run.

The reason that India’s strategy for governing is highly viable is that, unlike other countries, India’s regime has not made a Faustian bargain based around the economy. Putinist Russia has convinced people that a lack of freedom is their tradeoff for prosperity, and post-Mao Chinese leadership have mortgaged their country’s expansion of power on the international scale to the prospect of continuous economic expansion. Each of these countries faces a challenging economic circumstance, which may destabilize or topple the existing leadership if economic circumstances prove disadvantageous enough. India, despite being a developing country with an expanding economy, can pass through an economic downturn without seeing a major shock to its political system.

This is not to say that India does not face political challenges. The economy is certainly a factor in the country’s domestic and international political landscape. In Alyssa Ayres’ words, India was an “aurarky” for the first half-century of its existence, a command economy emphasizing self-containment and self-reliance. However, in 1990, India was forced into neoliberal economic reforms that opened the country to trade and the international economy. India’s economy has expanded ever since, including major progress by flagship industries such
as the IT sector. However, there are many laws on the books that stymie market forces. India’s
government since the reforms has pursued a strategy of gradual reformation, a slow pace made
necessary by the fractious and gridlocked nature of the country’s republican government and
historic and cultural hostility toward trade.

On the international front, India’s strategy has emphasized an accumulation of respect
and legitimacy. Just as the economic strategy shifted in the 1990s from autarky to neoliberalism,
the foreign policy strategy saw a shift in the same period with the end of the Cold War.
Following independence, India pursued a strategy of “nonalignment,” explicitly favoring neither
the West nor the Warsaw Pact; and again emphasizing the country’s self-reliance. Following the
collapse of the USSR, India eventually came to redefine nonalignment as an emphasis on
strategic economy. Thus, in the modern era, India’s international relations are focused on
balancing between competing powers, and an almost superstitious reluctance to enter into any
agreements (such as trade agreements or alliances) that would curtail the options of any future
Indian government. This allergy to path dependence has been the strategy of either side of the
political spectrum.

This is not to say that India doesn’t collaborate with anyone. As is deemed necessary or
appropriate, India cooperates on economic, military, or diplomatic efforts with the United States,
with China, or with other regional powers. India has sought to expand its military footprint to
encompass hegemony over the Indian Ocean, and increase its military spending. It has sought an
increased role for developing nations in international institutions such as the UN and IMF, and
formed small-scale (“minilateral”) institutions to address parochial concerns. This strategy, an
ambitious expansion of India’s role on the international scene, is not intended to specifically
offset any competing power, but simply to expand India’s influence in the world.
This hard power expansion is coupled with a soft-power expansion, mostly pursued by the Modi government. Hand-in-hand with India’s quest for respect and legitimacy from other nations (a natural reaction to a history of colonization) comes a rediscovery of India’s ancient civilizational accomplishments, and an aggressive effort to market these cultural influences to the rest of the world. These efforts are not in pursuit of any specific strategic goal, but are simply an effort to expand the place of India in the mind of foreigners.

India’s strategy for governance may seem unambitious compared to those of China or Russia, who have identified specific enemies that they seek to undermine and surpass. However, by emphasizing a democratic, consensus-based path toward governmental reform, and a foreign policy based on power without aggression, India has pursued a strategy that is more sustainable in the long-term than those of other major powers.
SAMPLE OF FINAL WEEK MEMOS

Memo prompt: We have examined the governing strategies of leaders in four countries (Russia, India, China, the United States). What do you think is the most difficult problem faced by all of these leaders, and what is your assessment of the ways in which different leaders have addressed this problem?
Week 6 Memo

Strategies for Governing and Popular Opinion

The regimes governing Russia, China, India, and the United States all must deal with the challenge of maintaining some level of popular support. The challenge is different between authoritarian regimes and democratic ones, but each regime’s strategy for governing has identified a clear constituency whose support is critical for the regime’s success and survival. For the most part, these critical constituencies can be formulated as the affluent middle class, though the particulars of each regime and strategy leads to a different social formulation for each.

In Russia, Vladimir Putin has, in Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s words, engaged an “unofficial social contract” with the Russian middle class whereby political freedom has been traded for increasing prosperity. Thus, maintaining a strong economy is important for Putin’s continued dominance. Similarly, China’s elite is held hostage by the “tyranny of rising expectations” as the country industrializes and improves its standard of living, and a similar constantly-expanding economy is necessary to keep money in the pockets of a restless middle class. David Shambaugh believes that eventually this social group will come to demand increased political clout. In republican India, Narendra Modi’s administration was elected with a promise to reduce corruption and increase the standard of living, though the Indian electorate does not have the same addiction to a maximum-profit economy that other countries have. Finally, Donald Trump’s administration was elected with a minority of the vote, riding a wave of disaffected anti-liberal supporters concentrated in key states. Trump’s political strategy (for he lacks a governing strategy) caters heavily to this base.

In each of these cases, support of a majority of the populace is not required. China and Russia rely on the newly-enriched middle class, India has most often been ruled by
parliamentary coalitions that don’t always correlate to the vote count, and Trump lost the popular vote. Beyond their critical voting bloc, strategies brought to bear on the remainder of the populace vary. Putin’s government has created institutions such as the ONF to bring a larger expanse of the populace under his political influence, even if they are not direct supporters of his. China, on the other hand, is slow to extend rights to some of its impoverished and migratory citizens, and is outright oppressive toward ethnic and national minorities with goals different from that of the regime (those treated with the most lenience are the most affluent, the citizens of Hong Kong). Modi’s government continues similar policies to those of previous regimes, and pays mainly lip service to its hardcore nationalist supporters. Modi seems most intent on improving output legitimacy, so that he is seen as succeeding at the tasks that prior administrations had failed at. Trump seems content to alienate everyone outside of his base, though he is occasionally influenced by the Republican establishment.

There is no clear division between the circumstances that lead to these strategies. The Russian and Chinese regimes are both authoritarian and both rely on economic prosperity to maintain the status quo. Putin’s control over the institutions of government is lacking, and thus popular support is an important element of his power. China, on the other hand, has a strong government, but also caters closely to its populace through strong welfare systems and a rigorous polling apparatus. Its elite is frightened of reform, seeing this as what caused the collapse of the Soviet Union. Modi seems most intent on improving output legitimacy, so that he is seen as succeeding at the tasks that prior administrations had failed at. Modi is widely popular within a Republican system in the face of a weak opposition, and maintains a status quo government with fairly modest reformist and incrementalist goals (despite likely being at the height of his political
power). Trump seems intent to have his base carry him to a second victory, perhaps not identifying the unique circumstances that led to the first.

Satisfying the needs of critical supporters is part of the governing strategy of all of these regimes. In some cases (such as Russia and China’s reliance on a strong economy), this support may not be tenable in the long term, perhaps necessitating a shift in strategy. When enlisting the support of a critical bloc, a regime must maintain a clear balance and not overpromise, and is best-served by diversifying its supporters and achieving buy-in and consent of the governed from large segments of the populace, instead of a minority that, if organized, could hold them hostage.
Week 6 Memo: A challenge facing all four leaders

A common problem among all four of the world leaders of the four vast multi-level governments of different styles we studied this semester is the difficulty each leader faces acting on their policy goals. Even in autocratic states like Russia and China, where Putin and Xi Jinping and the communist party maintain strongholds on power, a challenge persists in retaining centralized power and aligning lower levels of government to act. In a relatively thriving democratic society in India, Modi holds a high approval rating from citizens but centralizes a large number of policy responsibilities in his office, resulting in slow progress on policy action. In the U.S., Trump speaks provocatively and rallies public support around several policy issues but has accomplished next to nothing policy-wise in a system designed with layers of checks and balances.

Argument:

Putin sees no serious threat to his power on the horizon and power is increasingly centralized in Russia today, yet organizing the Russian government to act on his vision is harder than many may assume. Central to Putin’s governing strategy is the use of fear in maintaining internal order; Monaghan mentions "Russian leadership's attempt to rally support by combining propaganda and youth movements to prepare Russian society for the likelihood of future conflict" (53). Putin has also enacted structural reform to maintain order, like the May edicts, to increasingly centralize power while emphasizing economic growth. Despite all the factors that show Putin holds great power, Monaghan emphasizes that the bureaucracy does not act in a seamless vertical of power and notes that Putin must often flex his strength and implement “manual control” to achieve policy success. That Putin must continuously centralize power, rule
through fear, and implement manual control speaks to the level of challenge he faces in enacting policy.

In China, Xi Jinping also feels the need to exercise power with brutal force to maintain internal order and enact his policy vision. While the CPC holds power at all levels of the Chinese government, Shambaugh notes that lower levels of the Chinese bureaucracy often resist the orders of Xi Jinping and the implementation rate of policies is fairly low. As a result, Xi has leveraged his significant authority to launch a “vicious, ruthless” crackdown on dissent within the CPC and in civil society -- in the name of an anti-corruption campaign. “Xi believes that only by cracking down on signs of dissent in society, would he be able to achieve anything,” (BBC Radio podcast). Despite holding significant power, experts describe Xi as feeling very insecure in power. Due to a lack of cooperation at the lower levels of government, Xi has implemented a strategy of purging his party of opposition and cracking down on dissent in society, signaling the prominence of the challenge of policy implementation.

While India’s government and civil society is far more democratic and morally defensible than that of China or Russia, a similar problem of policy implementation exists for Modi. The systemic challenges standing in the way of expedient policy implementation are greater in India: a strong press and active civil society and a complex, multi-level system of relatively autonomous local government. But in addition to the naturally slow level of implementation in a democratic context, Modi’s actions centralizing power in his office show how the problem is central to Modi’s strategy. Originally an anti-establishment, Modi feels like a party outsider and has taken on between 50 and 60 different policy issues under his sole control. This makes policy implementation ever more difficult as he is only able to focus on 5 or 6 issues at a time; experts describe this policy load as “staggering” and “simply too much” (Australia India Institute
podcast). Modi’s actions centralizing can be perceived as authoritarian but they highlight how Modi has prioritized attempting to solve the problem of policy implementation -- he does not trust the lower levels of government or his own party to act out his vision.

The U.S. government has perhaps the most established and strong system of checks and balances out of all the systems of government we studied this semester. As a result, it is easy to assume that President Trump’s rate of implementing policy would be rather slow, regardless of his boisterous confidence and strong public support. Trump has a reasonably strong level of public support for his policy goals and a majority in Congress. Yet: “For nearly all of Trump’s first year -- with him having blown any chance for even a short honeymoon and failed to take advantage of a unified party government, relative global peace, and rising prosperity -- not a single important piece of legislation that he supported was enacted.” (Nelson, 148). Trump’s verbal assault on the press and dissent signals an insecurity with criticism and the natural checks and balances of the American democratic system.

Across the four countries studies, it is clear that all leaders are concerned with their rate of policy implementation. Even in autocratic systems, the rate of implementation can be slow and both Putin and Xi Jinping have increasingly centralized power, used fear as a mechanism of control and cracked down on dissent in an effort to make implementation of their policy visions either. In the democratic context, the actions of Modi and Trump can be seen as similar; they too work to centralize power as much as possible and limit dissent. Clearly, directing policy from the top down is a concern for all of these world powers.
Summary: The leaders we have studied have struggled to implement their policy agenda through their governments. Leaders have had different reactions to this challenge. Trump and Modi have essentially worked within the existing system, leveraging power where they can, but accepting the constraints of the respective democratic systems within which they work. Putin and Xi have taken a more autocratic approach, consolidating power through changes to government structure and rules.

In the United States, President Donald Trump has been stymied by checks and balances built into the government structure. When it came time to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act, Trump offered contradictory visions and ultimately undermined congressional leaders’ attempts to write a bill that would pass Congress – even though his party holds both chambers. He showed little competence in working with Congress (Nelson 86-87). Through the courts, the Trump administration’s agenda has been both obstructed and advanced. The courts will be impacted for a generation or more by the conservative wave of judges Trump nominated and Congress confirmed during his first year (Nelson 69). On the other hand, courts have halted many of Trump’s attempts to further his agenda, including his first and second so-called “travel bans” (Nelson 71). Attorneys general from left-leaning states have also used the courts to try to stop Trump from implementing his agenda (65). The checks and balances that are part of the US political system require care and a slow pace of change, but also ensure that power is dispersed, not concentrated in the executive.

India, like the United States, is a republic with a head of state and with power dispersed to states and localities. This structure makes it harder for the federal government to implement
development projects such as the one that Narendra Modi, India’s Prime Minister, has made his signature project. Like Trump in the US, Modi has a lot of power because his party has an absolute majority in parliament (“Afternoon Adda” podcast). Unlike Trump, Modi also has a high approval rating among the Indian people (ibid). Modi has capitalized on this approval by attempting to build a grassroots social movement to improve sanitations throughout India (by building toilets) through the “Clean India” (Swachh Bharat) campaign. This is an example of an effective use of power through the existing governance structure.

Xi Jinping has also been effective at furthering his policy goals, but unlike Modi and Trump he has changed the governance structure of his country to do so. Xi’s strategy revolves around ensuring his country’s continued economic growth and stability. This involves quelling unrest or the threat of it, and using the tools of the central government to plan and stimulate the economic life of the country. Xi controls “everything” about Chinese society as the most powerful Chinese leaders since Mao (“President Xi and the Chinese Dream” podcast). However, even with so much power Xi has found it necessary to change China’s constitution so that he is able to stay in power longer than previous term limits allowed. Xi’s presidency represents a break from China’s previous path of reforms.

In Russia, Putin has also consolidated power in order to pursue his strategic agenda. Like Xi, Putin is concerned about staying in power and maintaining internal security in his country. To consolidate power, Putin has used the security council to both set strategic goals and to prepare the country for what he considers inevitable war with its adversaries. Although Russia has bureaucrats who would, in theory, manage projects to further the country’s strategic goals, Putin must micromanage work toward goals. He has also fired or forced out leaders who he feels have not properly worked toward the goals (Monaghan 56). Putin has to do this kind of
micromanagement because the bureaucrats who work under him are unable or unwilling to take the steps needed toward his goals (46). It appears that Putin has failed to motivate those working under him to work toward the goals.

The four leaders we studied in this class have struggled with a similar challenge: how to leverage their power to achieve their agenda. This challenge involves working through complex bureaucratic systems. Though the democratic countries we studied required more time and effort to make strategic changes politically, the power-limiting techniques such as federalism and the rule of law (Roberts 40) employed in the US and India make these countries more stable than Russia and China, which both depend on strong, hands-on leadership to implement strategy.
SUMMARY

In their maneuvers to maintain legitimacy, the current government leaders of the US, Russia, China, and India have all used strategies involving nationalism, centralization of political power, and some degree of manipulation of media and political messaging. All four nations have turned to a patriarchal leader who purports to be capable of achieving the country’s ambitions on the global stage, regardless of their internal and external challenges of governance.

The leaders of Russia, China, India and the US are all expected to guide their countries toward positions of strength and security in a world that is rapidly changing with globalization. All four of these political regimes employ strategies to ensure that their constituents view them as legitimate while they attempt to meet these larger challenges. Each faces potentially destabilizing forces from within and without, so in order to retain power they must maintain the perception of legitimacy as leaders who can gain international stature for their nation.

Some unexpected similarities are trending across the strategies of each of these nations’ leaders as they strive to maintain legitimacy. Given the huge historical, cultural, and structural differences between these countries, the differences between their approaches are more predictable. All four of these leadership regimes are moving toward a more authoritarian approach and centralizing power in a strong patriarchal figure, based on a precept that this is what nations need in times of an uncertain future.
It is surprising to see how the American president in particular is currently using information manipulation strategies that might be more expected in Russia or China. Trump’s strategy for maintaining legitimacy is heavily reliant on controlling the messages communicated to his base of supporters. He does this by communicating directly via social media, manipulating media cycles, and aggressively discrediting his critics (Nelson, 102-105). He has comprehensively discredited the media that report on his trend of lying to his constituents, disregarding the fact that free media is integral to free democracy. Yet this authoritarian approach is somehow working to maintain his legitimacy; in 2017, 91% of Republicans trusted Trump more than CNN (Ibid, 105).

Russian president Putin also manipulates media messaging with state-sponsored propaganda. Putin has consolidated authoritarian power under himself while professing to have remained in power for nearly two decades through democratic elections. He builds legitimacy with messages that encourage nationalism and mobilization against contrived external threats, diverting attention from domestic problems, and emphasizing the perceived need for a strong patriarchal leader (Monaghan, 52). This is another Russian communication strategy that President Trump mirrors with his nationalist rhetoric.

China has a vastly different culture and a single-party communist government, but a similar theme in its turn back toward hard authoritarianism under President Xi. The CCP also disseminates propaganda to rally support for Xi, who is portrayed as the Confucian father that the Chinese need to direct the nation (Buckley). Xi has assumed a position over the CCP’s massive vertical of power and continues to centralize political power for himself with the removal of term limits. He gains legitimacy with messaging that frames China’s economic growth as dependent on CCP governance, which is a strategy that Putin also employs.
Given India’s history of recent colonial rule and then socialism, it’s somewhat surprising how insistent their society has become on ensuring legitimacy through democratic processes, including high civic engagement and several political parties (Ayres). Yet, India also has moved toward greater centralization of power in an influential leader, Modi. He is seen by some as authoritarian, yet maintains strong public approval (Australia India Institute). Nationalism has gained support in India also, with a push for Hindu cultural and political dominance over a nation that is struggling with its religious and cultural diversity (Ibid). Modi advocates for cultural unification, perhaps like Trump and Xi do. Modi is also pushing Indian cultural images out as a way of gaining influence in foreign relations (Ibid). This helps earn legitimacy with Indians who want greater international respect for India (Ayres). A similar drive exists in China, where Xi’s ambition matches and represents the nation’s aim to become a global leader (BBC).

All four of these nations are questioning their position in the future world order. The current regimes channel this anxiety into nationalist enthusiasm for a leader perceived as strong and capable, thereby gaining support for increased authoritarianism and centralization of power. These messages disregard the challenges that threaten the success of each of these nations and the stability of these four regimes.
World leaders must deal with the problem of how to placate and appease their populace on a daily basis. Through looking at the governance and strategies of four major nations we can see some of the dominant techniques used to alleviate this issue. The use of tradition and calling upon the systems and glory of the past can give the leader a feeling of legitimacy which is supported by the weight of time immemorial. By calling upon this type of legitimacy, they are able to frame their actions as almost fatalistic results of courses of action that started far before them.

For powers like China and Russia the risks of public unrest are largely direct security threats for their regimes. Both Xi and Putin have a recent history of ‘color revolutions’ hanging over them, and they must be careful to present that kind of uprising. In China these pressures come from the proliferation of NGOs and “private non-enterprise units” (Shambaugh 2016). In Russia, by contrast, color revolutions have tended to be greater risks in areas of ethnic minorities and former Soviet states (Monaghan 2017). The risk of violent upheaval seems to be a constant on the periphery of the socio-political consciousnesses of Xi and Putin because of the histories of those revolts.

While outright revolts are not entirely unprecedented, they are less likely in systems where a leader is up for re-election on a regular basis. Therefore, for ‘democratically’ elected leaders, the risk of unrest is starkly different. Both Modi and Trump must delicately balance keeping their populist bases and the political elites on their side. For Trump, his biggest struggle has been with the political elite. While he has had some trouble with the average moderate and liberal American, he has kept his base excited enough to allow him to create conflicts with leaders of both parties without creating a significant threat to his position. In India, internal conflict has been a part of their national tapestry
since they gained independence. The risk of terrorist attack is still very real, and their social problems, such as sanitation and poverty, have caused the people to be generally dissatisfied with their government (Ayres 2018). Modi walks the fine line of placating his people while also not angering the capitalists of India who are used to enjoying a lot of political influence.

The most benign way that these leaders try to keep unrest at bay is by appealing to the socio-cultural traditions of their countries. In China, Xi has been quoted in public using Confucian quotes and messages when communicating to the people. By doing this he is calling back to the ancient bureaucracies which he hopes will strengthen his standing and also seems to be loosening religious restrictions that have been in place since the days of Mao. Putin presents himself as a rugged Russian man, who is happy with hard work and the rough environment of the Russian countryside. He projects stability by creating an environment that harkens back to the early Soviet era. His restriction and abuses are painted as a way to pull Russia out of the tumultuous period following the dissolution of the USSR.

Democratic leaders use this technique slightly differently because they are using to affect more votes for themselves and their party-mates. Modi, like other Indian leaders before him, has called on historic anti-colonial narratives in order to defend the protectionist policies that he has supported. He was elected from a traditionally Hindu party and has worked to bring some kind of world political important in the vein of the ancient Hindu kingdoms that parlayed with Alexander and fought of the Mughal invasion. In the United States, Trump has called on his supporters to think back to a day at some point in America’s past when the country was ‘great’. He insists that
something has changed, and by following him the country can return to whatever this greatness looks like.

Political and social unrest can quickly unravel an otherwise stable national administration. Leaders must use a number of tactics in order to ensure that they are not overtaken by that upheaval, but there are some general trends. One trend that is seen is a call to traditional values to justify their behavior. It is important to recognize that tactic, as policy analysts, because it will allow us to be less susceptible to the coercive potential it has over policy.
### UMass Amherst CPE Student Response to Instruction (SRTI)
**SUMMER 2018 SECTION REPORT: ITEM FREQUENCIES**

**Course:** PUBP&ADM 597S  
**Section #: 01**  
**Class #: 61475**  
**Instructor:** Roberts, Alasdair S  
**Enrolled:** 8  
**Responded:** 5  
**Response rate:** 63%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Label</th>
<th>5</th>
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<th>3</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>OMIT</th>
<th>N</th>
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<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The instructor explained course material clearly. (5=Almost always, 1=Almost never)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The instructor cleared up points of confusion. (5=Almost always, 1=Almost never)</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The instructor used instructional time well. (5=Almost always, 1=Almost never)</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The instructor inspired interest in the subject matter of this course. (5=Almost always, 1=Almost never)</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>The instructor showed a personal interest in helping students learn. (5=Almost always, 1=Almost never)</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>I received useful feedback on my performance on tests, papers, etc. (5=Almost always, 1=Almost never)</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>The methods of evaluating my work were fair. (5=Almost always, 1=Almost never)</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>The instructor stimulated student participation. (5=Almost always, 1=Almost never)</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Overall rating of this instructor's teaching. (5=Almost always effective, 1=Almost never effective)</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<th>This course is a</th>
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<th>Hours per week spent working on course</th>
<th>Expected grade</th>
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<td>Major requirement</td>
<td>Freshmen 0%</td>
<td>Less than 1 hour 0%</td>
<td>A 80%</td>
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<td>Gen. Ed. requirement</td>
<td>Sophomore 0%</td>
<td>1-2 hours 0%</td>
<td>A- 20%</td>
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<td>Other requirement</td>
<td>Junior 0%</td>
<td>2-4 hours 0%</td>
<td>B+ 0%</td>
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<td>Elective</td>
<td>Senior 0%</td>
<td>4-6 hours 20%</td>
<td>B 0%</td>
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<td>Missing</td>
<td>Graduate 100%</td>
<td>6-8 hours 0%</td>
<td>B- 0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>Other 0%</td>
<td>8-10 hours 40%</td>
<td>C+ 0%</td>
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<td>Missing</td>
<td>Missing 0%</td>
<td>More than 10 hours 40%</td>
<td>C 0%</td>
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<td>Missing 0%</td>
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<td>C- 0%</td>
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<td>Missing 0%</td>
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<td>D+ 0%</td>
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<td>D 0%</td>
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<td>F 0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>Missing 0%</td>
<td>Missing 0%</td>
<td>Other 0%</td>
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For more information or help interpreting your results visit www.umass.edu/oapa. Office of Academic Planning and Assessment, 09/11/2018
Course: PUBP&ADM 597S  Section#: 01  Class#: 61475  Instructor: Roberts, Alasdair S
Enrolled: 8  Responded: 5  Response rate: 63%

**COMPARISON GROUP: Undergraduate sections**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Instructor</th>
<th>Dept: PUBPADM</th>
<th>College: SBS</th>
<th>Campus</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Avg. SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The instructor was well prepared to teach the class. (5=Almost always, 1=Almost never)</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The instructor explained course material clearly. (5=Almost always, 1=Almost never)</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The instructor cleared up points of confusion. (5=Almost always, 1=Almost never)</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The instructor used instructional time well. (5=Almost always, 1=Almost never)</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The instructor inspired interest in the subject matter of this course. (5=Almost always, 1=Almost never)</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>The instructor showed a personal interest in helping students learn. (5=Almost always, 1=Almost never)</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>I received useful feedback on my performance on tests, papers, etc. (5=Almost always, 1=Almost never)</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>4.1</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>The methods of evaluating my work were fair. (5=Almost always, 1=Almost never)</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>The instructor stimulated student participation. (5=Almost always, 1=Almost never)</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>4.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Overall, how much do you feel you learned in this course? (5=Much more than most, 1=Much less than most)</td>
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<td>1.20</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Overall rating of this instructor's teaching. (5=Almost always effective, 1=Almost never effective)</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Overall rating of this course. (5=One of the best, 1=One of the worst)</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For more information or help interpreting your results visit www.umass.edu/oapa. Office of Academic Planning and Assessment, 09/11/2018

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**Reported only if data were available for 10 or more sections. Comparison means calculated using combined fall 2017, winter 2018, spring 2018, and summer 2018 CPE SRTI results. A comparison group mean is the grand mean of a set of section means or standard deviations (SD) not the mean or SD of student responses pooled across sections. Undergraduate sections are the comparison group for 500-level courses. Dept=CPE courses from the same department or course subject; College=CPE courses from all other departments in the school/college; Campus=All CPE courses.**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What you like most about this course or the instructor's teaching of it?</th>
<th>What about this course or the teaching of it needs change or improvement?</th>
<th>What suggestions can you offer that would have made this course a better learning experience for you?</th>
<th>Any additional comments?</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clearly a subject the Professor has worked in; good selection of countries</td>
<td>Consider more primary sources - Chinese intellectuals talking about China, etc. All of the books were by Westemers whom (it seemed) had studied in those countries for study abroad.</td>
<td>Not that I'm not grateful for the straightforwardness of the class, but it would not have been untoward to have a final summing-up beyond the weekly memos. A perfectly reasonable and perhaps natural option would have been a research paper to find and assess the governing strategies of a country of our choosing. Honestly, without it, the class probably comes off as a bit too easy.</td>
<td>I could have easily gone for another two or three weeks with a same format on additional countries. Class was well thought-out and well put-together; Prof. tried hard to stimulate discussion and back-and-forth, instead of the occasional recitation and putting-in-time that is often part of online classes. Video/audio conferences were a good idea for this.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Really enjoyed the consistency of the methods of analyzing individual countries'/leaders' strategies for governing.</td>
<td>Can't think of anything</td>
<td>Can't think of anything</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The format of the course was great and made a lot of sense. It took some time for the discussion board to work well, but by the end the discussions were great. The call-in discussions were good.</td>
<td>I'm not sure all of the course material made sense for the theme of the course, of grand strategies for governing countries.</td>
<td>More focus on learning about the individual countries' histories and political structure.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a timely demonstration the how of objective political analysis should be handled as well as the form it should take. Memo format forced a thoughtful and concise statement of opinion.</td>
<td>perhaps a longer weekly call, (2 hours) for the abbreviated summer session format?</td>
<td>he ability to see other's weekly memos might have provided additional insight into the variety of topics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The professor encouraged us to expand our perspectives on public administration through taking a 20,000 foot view of how and why governments operate across a few very different, yet similar countries.</td>
<td>No recommendations at this time. The instructor was very clear, available, and responsive to any questions.</td>
<td>No recommendations at this time.</td>
<td>I thoroughly enjoyed this course</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>